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CIGAREYFE TAXATION AND THE
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING
ABSTRACT
Thispaper assesses the appropriate cigarettetax needed to address potential market
failures. There is no evidence of inadequate risk decisions bysmokers regarding their own
welfare. Detailed calculations of the financial externalities of smokingindicate that the financial
savings from premature mortality in terms of lower nursinghome costs and retirement pensions
exceed the higher medical care and life insurance costs generated.The costs of environmental
tobacco smoke are highly uncertain, but of potentiallysubstantial magnitude. Even with






Durham, NC 27708-00971. IntroductiOn
Cigarette smoking has long beenthe object of social
controversy and policy interventions.However, in recent years
this scrutiny has become increasingly great.Within 1994 alone
there was an unusually large flurryof anti-smoking activity.
The chairman of the Food and DrugAdministration speculated that
cigarettes should be regulated bythat agency because, in his
view, nicotine is addictive. The OccupationalSafety and Health
Administration proposed a ban on smoking inthe workplace, except
in situations in which firms provide designated,ventilated
smoking areas.Similarly, Congress, with the supportof the
u.s. Environmental Protection Agency, beganconsidering
legislation that would lead to a ban on publicsmoking.2
Within the context of this anti-smoking fervor,legislators
have also turned to cigarette taxes as amechanism for raising
revenues to partially finance the proposedhealth care reforms.
Although Federal cigarette taxes arecurrently 24 cents per pack,
the proposed legislation would increasethese taxes further. The
mid-1994 version of the Clinton planwould impose a tax of 99
cents per pack, the health care proposal bySenate majority
leader George Mitchell would impose a taxof 69 cents per pack,
and one draft health care bill from the HouseEducation and Labor
Committee would impose a tax of two dollars perpack.
The legislators who proposed these taxes mayoverestimate
the ultimate tax revenues if they failto recognize the demand
See Federal Register (1994).
2Seethe u.s. Environmental Protection Agency(1994).response. Not only is the demand for smoking quite elastic and
similar to that of many other goods, but the long—run elasticity
is even greater than in the short—run. As a result, economists
such as Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) have estimated that
the long-run revenue effects of the cigarette taxes will e less
dramatic than the short-run revenue gains.
There are many reasons why from a political standpoint taxes
might be imposed. One possible explanation is political
expediency. Cigarette smokers now constitute a minority of the
population. Moreover, given the social controversy pertaining to
smoking, they are a vulnerable minority for which there will be
lower political costs associated with taxation than, for example,
a more broadly based tax.
There may also be legitimate economic rationales for taxing
cigarettes, wholly apart from the desire to raise revenues.
Cigarette taxes and alcohol taxes are among the most widely used
forms of "sin taxes." The economic rationale for such taxes is
that imposing taxes discourages behavior that may be associated
with inefficient decisions. The inadequacies in behavior may
pertain to the choices by smokers with respect to their own well-
being or that of their families. Taxes could be imposed to align
these decisions with what would prevail if individual choices
were rational from a self-interest standpoint. A second impetus
for taxation would arise if there were net external costs imposed
on the rest of society by cigarette smoking. In that case,
cigarette taxes would function much like a Pigouvian tax to lead
2smokers to internalize the external costs of their actions.
Although the potential rationales for cigarette taxation are
clear, whether or not there should be taxation of any kind from
the standpoint of promoting efficient decisions is not
theoretically obvious. Smokers may ignore the externality to
their future selves and their families and make inadequate self-
protective decisions. However, there may also be distortions of
the opposite type in which smokers overestimate the risk and
place too great a weight on the losses involved. The efficient
risk is not necessarily zero but rather one that reflects the
competing benefits and costs associated with smoking activity.
The externality aspects of smoking likewise involve
competing effects. Cigarette smokers have no private incentive
to internalize all of the effects of smoking on others, but these
effects are not necessarily adverse on balance. To the extent
that cigarette smoking leads to adverse health consequences,
there will be higher health insurance costs associated with these
illnesses as well as other social externalities, such as life
insurance costs. However, there may also be offsetting cost
savings from earlier mortality through reduced costs of pensions,
Social Security, Medicare, and health expenditures later in life.
In tallying these externalities, one should also take into
account any adverse health effects of environmental tobacco smoke
to the extent that these can be reliably estimated. It is not
clear a priori whether the cost savings to society are exceeded
by the costs imposed on society. Resolving these issuesrequires
3a detailed empirical assessment of the competing influences.
In this paper I will provide a careful examination of the
social consequences of smoking both for the smoker and society at
large. Past analyses directed at ascertaining the net cost of
smoking and the appropriate taxation of smoking have focused only
on one of the two components, either the individual effects or
the societal insurance effects. This paper will be the first to
incorporate both dimensions into the analysis. In addition, the
assessment of the social consequences of smoking will include
extensions that have not appeared in previous assessments. This
analysis incorporates recognition of the possible costs
associated with environmental tobacco smoke. In addition, all
the risk assessments will recognize the changing character of
cigarettes and, in particular, the dramatic reduction in the tar
levels of cigarettes over the past several decades. In contrast,
past risk assessments and evaluations of cigarettes have all
utilized risk estimates that pertain to an era of cigarette
smoking in which the product had quite different characteristics
than those marketed today.
After reviewing the rationale for setting cigarette taxes in
Section 2, I will provide a profile of current cigarette taxes in
Section 3. cigarette tax revenues are quite substantial, but
these taxes are also regressive in character, which is an
unattractive feature. Section 4 details the shift in the tar
characteristics in cigarettes and the implications of this shift
for cigarette risk assessments. In Section 5, I assess the
4externalities of cigarette smoking tothe smoker's future self
and to the smoker's family.SectiOn 6 assesses the insurance—
related externalities associatedwith smoking, including effects
on health insurance, SocialSecurity, pensions, life insurance,
and related programs. Section 7broadens the discussion to
include the public health risk consequencesof environmental
tobacco smoke. As the concludingSection 8 indicates, on balance
the net social consequences ofsmoking do not appear to be
adverse. From the standpoint of anoptimal sin tax, no
additional taxation appears warranted.The current level of
taxes already exceeds what is requiredto reflect the estimated
adverse social consequences of smoking.
2. setting the Efficient TaxLevel
To determine the optimal sin taxin the case of cigarette
smoking, one should assess howthis tax should be adjusted to
reflect both the potential welfarelosses to smokers as well as
the losses to society that arenot accounted for in private
smoking decisions. For the purposeof this discussion, I will
hypothesize that individuals potentiallyunderestimate the risks
of smoking and that there are netsocietal costs imposed by
smoking. If there are such marketfailures, how then could the
tax system serve a constructiverole in rectifying these errors
in decisions? Frameworks such asthese follow a logic thae is
natural for economists, but policymakerSconsidering smoking
taxes seldom frame these taxesin terms of deterring smokingin
an efficient manner. In effect,the potential efficiency
5properties of the risky decisions are neglected,and there is
typically exclusive emphasis on the potentialerrors in these
decisions.
The framework here will focus on an individualdecision
maker. If this person does not smoke cigarettes, thenthe
consumer will derive a welfare level W(Y) from anincome level 1.
The consumer has the opportunity to purchase cigarettesat a
price P, and doing so will lead to two possiblehealth state
outcomes, good health in which the individualderives a utility
U(Y-P) and ill health in which the utility levelis V(Y-P). The
ill health state potentially could be death, in which case Vwill
serve as the bequest function. Assume that thereis a true
health risk irposedby cigarettes, where this probability is not
necessarily known to the decision maker. There is also asocial
loss L that does not enter the decision maker's calculus of
attractiveness of smoking, where the probability that the loss
will be inflicted is IT.
Fromthe standpoint of social desirability of smoking, the
individual is making a rational choice if the expected utility
derived by the smoker from smoking exceeds the expected cost
imposed on society plus the utility derived from not smoking, or
(1- it)U(Y- P) +itV(Y- F)>W(Y)+tL. (1)
This formulation ignores the role of taxation, which will be
introduced subsequently as a mechanism for eliminating potential
errors in decisions.
There are two principal ways in which decisions might be
6flawed. First, individuals may not haveaccurate perceptions of
the risk r, and second they will have noprivate incentive to
recognize the net externality costs imposedby others. In
particular, the private decisionin the case in which there is
not taxation will be based on theindividual's assessed
probability of ill health q, which maydiffer from ir, leading to
a private choice criterion of
(1- q)U(Y- P) +gV(Y-P) > W(Y). (2)
The private decision differs from the optimalsocial decision in
that it neglects the expected externalitycost and does not
account for the possible discrepancy between irand q. In effect,
smokers could fail in two ways ——byharming their future selves
and by imposing net externality costs onsociety.
Even if smokers do not accurately perceivethe risks, it
does not necessarily follow that theirdecisions are in error.
Consider the case in which individuals underasseSsthe risks
associated with smoking. It may be that evenwith an
underassesSnient the decision to smoke wouldnot be altered if the
consumer's risk perception were replaced bythe true probability
iT.Thus,the pertinent issue from the standpointof efficient
decision making with respect to riskinformation is whether risky
decisions would be the same in the presenceof better risk
information or whether they would change.
Suppose that S is the amount that anindividual needs to be
compensated in order to be made indifferentbetween smoking and
non-smoking. In the case of people who preferto smoke, the
7value of S is positive, whereas in the caseof people who choose
not to smoke the value of S is negative sothat they would be
willing to pay some non-zero amount toavoid smoking. Suppose
that evaluated at the true risk it,peoplewould choose to smoke.
Then S is positive and satisfies the followingcondition
(1 -t)U(Y*S-P)+iV(Y+S -P)=W(Y). (3)
If individuals underestimate the risk initially (i.e., q<ir)but
still would have a positive value of S when evaluatedat the true
probabilities as in equation 3, then cigarette smokingis still
rational from the individual's standpoint.
If, however, q is sufficiently below itthenthe situation
may arise in which based on the truerisk of smoking it would not
be rational to smoke. The value of S evaluated at thetime risk
itconsequentlywill be negative.
This bias in consumer perspectives can potentially be
reduced or eliminated through information provision. The
government can convey information about the hazardsof smoking so
that individuals revise their subjective probabilityassessments
q for the smoking risks and increasethem to a more appropriate
level it.Nevertheless,even with accurate risk perceptions the
expected societal loss term on the right side of equation1 will
not be incorporated in individual actions. What isneeded from
an economic standpoint is some mechanism to discouragesmoking so
individuals will, in effect, have the appropriate disincentive
for smoking given the societal costs. This class of problemsis
the well known Pigouvian externality situation inwhich an
8appropriate tax can lead individual economicactors to
incorporate the external effects of theirdecisions in their
behavior. In addition, this tax may also serve thefunction of
discouraging smoking in much the same way as would higherrisk
perceptions. Thus, a tax can both reflect thesocietal
externality as well as the discrepancy between qand ir in
situations in which individuals underassess the smokingrisk.
The individual will choose to smoke in the presence of a tax
T if this tax satisfies
(1- q)U(Y-P- T) +gV(Y—P- 1') > W(Y). (4)
This tax will lead to the same pattern of individualdecisions as
in the socially optimal situation characterized by inequality1
if it is set appropriately.
The focus of the subsequent sections will be twofold.
First, I will examine possible discrepancies between qand ir and
how these influence individuals' propensity to smoke.Second, I
will address the wide range of externalities associatedwith
smoking to ascertain their magnitude, direction,and relationship
to an appropriate tax level.
3. Profile of the cigarette Tax
Cigarettes are the most heavily taxed major categoryof
consumer purchases. Relative to the purchaseamount, tobacco
products are subject to a higher tax ratethan alcohol, three
times the tax rate of gasoline, and over ten timesthe tax rate
9imposed on items such as utilities andautomobiles.3
Since roughly one-fourth American adults continue to smoke,
the potential tax revenues associated with the cigarette tax are
substantial.For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1993 thu
total of Federal, state, and municipal taxes on cigarettes was
$12 billion.5 This tax share is roughly equally divided butween
the Federal government and the states. The total Federal tobacco
tax was $5.5 billion in 1993, or an average of 24 cents a pack.
The state tax total was $6.2 billion, or 28.6 cents per pack.
Overall, the Federal and state taxes totaled 31.4 percent of the
retail price of cigarettes. Municipal taxes added an additional
$187 million. Since almost all of the tobacco taxes are
accounted for by cigarettes ——98.7percent in 1993 ——Iwill use
the cigarette tax and tobacco tax label interchangeably.6
Although the absolute magnitude of cigarette taxes has never
been higher than at its current level, these taxes have been
higher as a percentage of the retail price. These taxes reached
a peak of 51.4 percent of the total price of cigarettes in 1965,
These assessments are based on the calculations presented
by Fullerton and Rogers (1993), p. 74. Their measure of the
severity of taxation is the ratio of taxes paid to the value of
gross purchases minus taxes paid. Based on this statistic, the
implied tax rate in 1984 for tobacco is 0.79, for alcohol it is
0.73, for gasoline it is 0.26, and for utilities it is 0.04, and
for automobiles it is 0.06.
See Center for Disease Control (1994).
These and other tax statistics reported in this paragraph
are drawn from the Tobacco Institute (1993), page vii.
6 Thispercentage of the cigarette tax share is drawn from
page 5 of the Tobacco Institute (1993).
10immediately after the initial government report on lung cancer
and smoking. The percentage taxation varies overtime because
the tax is set in absolute amounts and is varied periodically.
Over the past 50 years, Federal cigarette taxes haveheld only
five different levels, 7.0 cents per pack beginningin 1942, 8.0
cents per pack in 1951, 16.0 cents per pack in 1983, 20.0cents
per pack in 1991, and 24.0 cents per packin 1993. The •absolute
level of the tax and the periodic nature of the taxrevision has
as a consequence resulted in swings in the cigarettetax
percentage relative to retail price.
To assess the regressivity of cigarette taxes, Table 1
provides information on the distribution of taxes byincome
group. An introductory caveatis that one should be cautious in
interpreting the incidence statistics for cigarettetaxes since
the income levels are based on reported income at a pointin
time. Income levels for lower income groups appear tobe poorly
measured, and these figures substantially understatethe lifetime
income levels for these groups. As shown in Poterba (1989),the
lifetime incidence patterns of taxes tend to be more egalitarian
than the cross-sectional statistics would suggest.
Even taking these cautionary observations into account,the
patterns in Table 1 appear to be particularlystark. Column two
of Table 1 indicates the percentage of the differentincome
groups who smoke. This percentageis a high 31.6 percent for
those who make less than $10,000 and has a lowvalue of 19.3

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 overall share of the smoking population, which is given in column
three, both the smoking prevalence and the income groupss share
in the population are pertinent. For the income groups shown,
the most frequently represented smoking group is the middle
income range at $20,000-34,999, but this is also the group with
the largest fraction of the population.
A more pertinent statistic is the smoking fraction of the
different income group relative to the fraction of the population
represented by that income group. This ratio, which appearsin
column four of Table 1, indicates that the smoker ratio is
highest for the poorer income groups and lowest for the upper
income groups. This ratio ranges from 1.24 for those who make
less than $10,000 to 0.75 for those who make $50,000 or more.
For the three lowest of the five income groups shown inTable 1,
the relative smoking fraction of the group exceeds the population
fraction, which is striking evidence of the income status
correlation of smoking.
The average taxes paid for each person in the income group
range from $49 for those who make $50,000 or moreto $81 for
those who make less than $10,000. The cigarette tax per person
is consequently over one and one-half times as great forthe
poorest segment of the population when comparedwith the most
affluent group. These absolute differences lead to evenstarker
percentage differences, as is indicated in columnsix. As a
percentage of individual income, cigarette taxes arenegligible
for those who make $50,000 or more, as these taxesconstitute
12under one-tenth of one percent of this group'sincome. In
contrast, for those who make less than $10,000, the cigarettetax
amount averages 1.62 percent.
These calculations, however, understate the ultimate effect
of cigarette taxes on those who pay them since they averagethe
tax amount over the entire population in the income group,not
simply smokers. If one focuses on column seven in Table- 1, one
finds that the cigarette tax percentage of the median income of
smokers ranges from 0.4 percent for those who make $50,000 or
more to a percentage amount that is almost 13 times as great——
5.1percent for those who make less than $10,000. Cigarette
taxes are strikingly regressive.
Because of the strong correlation of income and educational
levels, the educational breakdown of tax incidence shown in Table
1 follows a pattern similar to what one would expect based on the
income breakdowns. The average taxes paid per person decline
steadily with educational level, as these amounts exhibit a high
value of $82 per person for those with less than a high school
education, and a low of $47 per person with at least some
college. The racial differences shown in Table 1 appear to be
relatively minor, as blacks pay an average tax per person almost
identical to that of whites.
The starkest distinction shown in Table 1 is the strong
linkage of cigarette taxes to individual income levels. A
negative feature of cigarette taxes is their regressivity. Since
cigarette consumption is a decreasing function of income, even
13the total amount of cigarette taxes paid bythe lower income
groups is greater than thatin upper income groups. Cigarette
taxes are consequently regressive inabsolute terms, not simply
in proportional terms.
4. The Changing cigarette
The increased public concern with therisks of smoking has
led to two major changes in thecharacteristics of cigarette
smoking. First, cigarette smoking ismuch less prevalent now
than it was in the past. Second, thekinds of cigarettes people
smoke are quite different than those smokeddecades earlier. In
particular, the "tar" level, whichis the most frequently used
composite measure of the chemical residueslinked to cancer risks
of smoking, has declined as smokers haveswitched to lighter
cigarettes. Many assessments of cigarettesmoking have taken
into account the changing frequency of smoking,but none of these
studies has incorporated the shift in tarlevels in these risk
assessments.
This omission is quite fundamental, as it hasbroad
ramifications for the assessed risks of smoking,the rationality
of smoking decisions, and the magnitudeof societal
externalities. Lower tar levels imply that therisk levels
associated with smoking will be less than thosethat have been
estimated. This discrepancy is not a minor nuance.The
pertinent smoking era currently usedfor many risk assessments
may be as much as a half a centuryout of date.
Twolagsarise. First, the studies that are usedin
14formulating the risk assessments often are not current, but
instead have been undertaken a decade or more ago. Second,the
smoking exposures that gave rise to the risks identifiedin these
studies preceded the publication dates for these studies because
of the substantial lag involved between exposure to carcinogens
and incidence of the disease. If, for example, there is a three
decade lag between cigarette smoking and the onset of lung
cancer, and if the study estimating such a linkageis a decade
old, then in effect there is a 40 year lag in the pertinence of
the evidence.
In this section I will review the changing history of the
tar levels of cigarettes and the implications of this shift for
the potential riskiness of cigarette smoking. The adjustments
that I will make will be linear, as reductions in tar will be
weighted proportionally.7 These adjustments are likely to be
overly conservative to the extent that there is a no-risk
threshold for carcinogenic exposures, which is consistent with
much of the evidence on the causation of cancer.8
Figure 1 illustrates the shifting level of tar in
cigarettes.9 The bottom trend, indicated as the "raw" data,
Evidence in support of the linearity of the dose-response
relationship appears in the International Agency for Research on
Cancer (1985)
8 For discussion of the zero or minimal risks posed by low
levels of carcinogens, see Ames and Gold (1993), especially pp.
154—157. Also see Cothern (1992).
The tar data for 1954 and for 1968-83 are from the Center
for Disease Control (1989), p. 21. Data for 1955—67 are from


















































































































































































































































































 pertain to the average level of tar in cigarettesobserved in
that year. These levels were estimated to be 46.1 milligramsof
tar per cigarette in 1944, which dropped to 12 milligramsof tar
by 1994.
Figure 1 also illustrates the 20 year and 30 year avrageof
these tar levels, where these averages are for the 20 and 30 year
period preceding the date indicated. These moving averages
indicate higher average tar levels of cigarettes and smoother
declines. Examination of these 20 and 30 year averages is
potentially more pertinent to the extent that it is a weighted
average of exposure amounts over a long periodof time that
generates the risk rather than point estimates of therisk level.
All of the results in Figure 1 pertain to risk levels at a period
of time, taking into account only those lags explicitly
indicated. If the lag structure is somewhat different, as for
example would be the case if risk exposures in the pastdecade
did not affect one's probability of cancer but those in the two
previous decades did, then one would want to utilize a different
weighting process.
The raw average tar levels of cigarettes display a slight
increase in the 1980s in Figure 1. This trend is attributable at
Data for 1984-1993 are derived by running a regression of average
tar levels on the percent of cigarettes with less than 15mg of
tar (1967-83) and using the resulting coefficient to estimate tar
levels. Data for 1923-53 are derived by running a regression of
average tar levels on year and using the resultingcoefficient to
estimate tar levels. The data on percent of cigarettes with less
than 15mg of tar are taken from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(1992), pp. 28—30.
16least in part to the rising market share of generic cigarettes.
Generic cigarettes have a higher average tar level than premium
brands, contributing to the observed pattern.
Figure 2 indicates the implications of thesetar adjustments
for the potential riskiness of cigarette consumption.Those
figures represent smoking levels per capita,where the base is
the entire adult (age 18 and above) U.S. population, not.simply
the smoking population. The unadjusted data appear atthe top of
Figure 2, as the number of cigarettes consumed per capitarose
until 1964, which is the year in which the U.S. Departmentof
Health, Education and Welfare issued its landmark reporton lung
cancer and smoking.'° Cigarette consumptioncontinued to
decline at a moderate pace until around 1983, afterwhich
consumption of cigarettes has decreased more starkly.
The bottom pattern of cigarette consumption in Figure2
makes a tar adjustment, relative to the tar levelsin cigarettes
in 1944. Whereas unadjusted cigarette consumption was risingfor
the next two decades, the tar-adjusted cigarette consumption
levels were on the decline. This decrease occurred longbefore
the advent of on-product cigarette warnings,television and radio
ad bans, and the concern over environmental tobaccosmoke.
Indeed, the pattern of tar-adjusted smokingexhibits a fairly
steady decline over the 1944-1984 period.
One of the steepest periods of decline in thetar-adjusted

























































































































































































































 cigarette consumption and in the average tarlevels per cigarette
shown in Figures 1 and 2 was 1957 to 1960.This was the era of
the "Great Tar Derby" in which the cigarette companies undertook
an advertising war to highlight the tarand nicotine levels of
their cigarettes.'1 This market-based competition led to
advertising claims, such as "Today's Marlboro-—22 percentless
tar, 34 percent less nicotine." The ban ontar and nicotine
advertising enacted DtheFederal Trade Commission in 1960
halted the dramatic decline in tar-adjusted levels of cigarettes,
leading to the flattening of the decline shownin Figure 1 and 2.
The main implication of Figure 2 is that the tar-weighted
cigarette consumption has followed a quitedifferent pattern than
overall per capita cigarette consumption and should lead to a
quite different interpretation of smoking trends.The decline in
the risk-weighted cigarette consumption is not as recent a
phenomenon as the raw per capita cigarette consumptionfigures
would suggest. Tar-adjusted per capita cigarette consumptionhas
been on the decline for almost the entire past half century.
Moreover, because of the linkage of cigaretterisk estimates to
tar levels, these estimates must be revised to reflectthe tar
content in order to be pertinent to the changingcharacter of
cigarettes.
Figures 3a -3cindicate the smoker's lifetime tar-weighted
cigarette risks assuming various different lagsbetween cigarette
'1For further discussion of the Great Tar Derby see VisCusi







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 consumption and the generation of the risk. Whereas Figure 2
presented data per capita for the entire population, the data in
Figure 3a are per capita, where the baseline populationconsists
of smokers only. These figures account for changes in the number
of cigarettes smoked as the tar level changes but not whether
each particular cigarette was smoked more intensively. Figure 3a
is based on risks being contemporaneous.; Figure 3b incorporates a
20 year latency where there is a fixed lag of exactly 20 years
not a distributed lag over a twenty year period; and Figure 3c
incorporates a 30 year latency period. For example, therisks in
Figure 3b for 1964 arose from smoking in 1994. In each case,the
trends are indexed so that the relative exposure amount is 100 in
1944.
There is a wide discrepancy between the adjusted and
unadjusted lifetime exposure levels for cigarettes in 1994.
However, the spread between the adjusted and unadjustedtrends is
starkest at an earlier date in the case of the unadjusted
figures, as recognition of a 20 year latency period narrowsthe
gap between the adjusted and unadjusted figures,particularly
through the first three decades, and there is a furthernarrowing
of these early trends in the case of the 30 year latency period.
The extent to which the lifetime risk is consequently goingto be
affected by taking into account the tar and consumptionlevels
will consequently will depend both on the era in which therisk
assessments are made as well as the lag assumption thatis made.
5. Externalities to One's Future Self
19If smoking decisions do not satisfy the efficiency
properties outlined in Section 2 from the standpoint of
individual rationality, then there will be a market failure. If,
for example, smokers underestimate the risk and smoke in
situations in which they would not do so if fully informed, then
the resulting risk level will be inefficient. Schelling (1984)
refers to these errors as externalities to one's future self
because there is a time lag before the adverse effects of smoking
will become apparent. What Shelling suggests is that one's
future self may make different decisions than one would make if
fully apprised of the long-term consequences of smoking.
There are several ways in which decisions might err. For
example, some observers have hypothesized that even if people
understand the risk of smoking they may not appropriately value
the health consequences of smoking or may be addicted to smoking
and unable to alter their behavior. I explore these issues in
detail elsewhere in Viscusi (1992a), but it is worthwhile to
summarize some of the principal empirical results that suggest
that smoking behavior follows patterns similar to that of other
types of consumption goods. The price elasticity and income
elasticity estimates for the demand for cigarettes are similar to
those for other products. These elasticity values, which have
been documented in dozens of studies for several countries, range
from a negative price elasticity from -0.4 to a price elasticity
20for teenagers of -l.4. Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994)
also find that the long run elasticity is greater than the short
run elasticity, which is consistent withtheir model of rational
addiction.
The character of the tradeoffs that smokers make in other
contexts is also consistent with risk—taking decisions in the
smoking domain. In situations involving job hazards, smokers
require compensation per expected job injury of $26,100,whereas
the average worker receives compensation of $47,900 per
statistical injury. The group most averse to risks, non-
smoking individuals who also wear seatbelts, receive compensation
per expected injury of $83,200. The sortingof workers in the
labor market and the matching up of individuals to jobs of
different risk with their corresponding levels of compensation
consequently follows the patterns one would expect. Smokerstend
to be at the lower end of the range in terms of their implicit
value of job injuries. This relative standing is also
corroborated by the results in Ippolito and Ippolito (1984), who
found that the implicit value of life reflected in smoking
behavior was in the range of $300,000 to $600,000 in 1980,which
is similar to the implicit values of life displayed byworkers
who have matched themselves to relatively high riskjobs.'4
12A comprehensive review of this literature appears in
Viscusi (l992b)
13SeeViscusi (1992) and Hersch and Viscusi (1990).
14Fora survey of the value of life literature, seeviscusi
(l992a, 1993)
21The smoking propensity response to higher risk perceptions
is also consistent with rational decision making. Higher
assessed smoking risk probabilities decrease the probability that
an individual will smoke. Estimates in Viscusi (1992b) ol this
linkage indicate that if current average lung cancer risk
perceptions were decreased from their level of 0.43 to a value in
the estimated risk ranqe based on earlier scientific evidence of
0.05—0.10, then societal smoking rates would rise from 6.5
percent to 7.5 percent.
There is also evidence of responsiveness in terms of the
kinds of cigarettes selected.1 Individuals who express
concerns about the health consequences of smoking are much more
likely to smoke low tar cigarettes (less than or equal to three
milligrams tar per cigarette), as 87.1 percent of those who smoke
low tar cigarettes indicate such health concerns. In contrast,
individuals who smoke high tar cigarettes (greater than or equal
to 21 milligrams tar per cigarette) are much less likely to
express concern with the health risks of smoking, as only 54.8
percent of this group indicates concern.
The primary focal point of my discussion will be on whether
smokers accurately perceive the risks of smoking. The two sets
of survey data I will use pertain to the years 1985 and 1991.
The key issue is whether smokers' risk beliefs in those years
were as high as would be warranted based on the scientific
evidence at that time.
See Viscusi (1992b).
22In assessing the accuracy of the risk perceptions one must
first establish the scientific reference point that will be used
to ascertain the true estimated risks of smoking. The surveys
focus on both lung cancer risks and total mortality risks so that
estimates are needed for each of these risk groups. In addition,
I make adjustments for the changing per smoker consumption of
cigarettes since individuals may, for example, smoke more
cigarettes if they have switched to lower tar cigarettes. Table
2 summarizes the sensitivity of the mortality estimates to the
changing level of tar in cigarettes. The three pairs of columns
pertain to the lung cancer risks, the overall mortality risk
after making a tar adjustment for lung cancer, and the overall
mortality risk making tar adjustments for all risks. Results
appear for both 1985 and 1988. The scientific reference point
that will be adopted utilizes the adverse health effect estimates
presented in the annual reports by the U.S. Surgeon General.'6
The first row of risk estimates pertains to the risk estimated
using scientific data available at the time of each of the survey
years. These data are not adjusted for changes in tar levels.
Both low and high estimates of the risk range appear in each
instance. The most recent data available for the survey year
1991 is based on 1988 studies. In the case of lung cancer, the
estimated lifetime incremental risk due to smoking ranged from
16 Further detailsexplaining the nature of my calculations
using these data appears in Viscusi (1992b). In my earlier
treatment I only considered the unadjusted figures, ignoring






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 0.05 to 0.10 in 1985 and from 0.06to 0.13 based on 1988
evidence. The total smoking mortality amount is roughly triple
the lung cancer risk, as it ranges from 0.16 to 0.32 in 1985 and
from 0.18 to 0.36 in 1988.
Three sets of mortality estimates appear in Table 2. The
first set pertains to lung cancer and the adjusted lung cancer
mortality rates. The second set of estimates addresses total
smoking mortality, with tar adjustments for only the lung cancer
component of total mortality, thus understating the potential
role of tar adjustments. The final pair of columns in Table 2
makes tar adjustments for all mortality components, which will
tend to overstate the effect of shifts in tar levels.
The effect of the tar adjustments is substantial. In the
case of lung cancer, the change in the risk levels based on point
estimates of the risk, ignoring lags in the generation of the
risk would be to decrease the risk range to 0.04—0.09 in 1985 and
from 0.05 to 0.12 in 1988. If, however, lung cancer risks are
generated by a moving average or by a lag, then the risk levels
that have been estimated by the Surgeon General will have been
generated by exposures to much higher levels of tar than are
present in the cigarettes today. Making the adjustments for the
20 year moving average or a 30 year moving average decrease the
estimated lung cancer risk by 0.02 so that the risk is
approximately cut in half by the 30 year moving average. If the
risk is generated by the point estimate of the exposure 20 or 30
years before the Surgeon General study, then the lower end of the
241985 risk range is reduced to 0.03 in the 20 year case and 0.02
in the 30 year case. In effect, one can eliminate up to two—
thirds of the lung cancer risk level by making an appropriate
adjustment for the tar levels of cigarettes.
The adjustments in the case of total smoking mortality are
less in relative terms when only the lung cancer component is
adjusted. Even in the 30 year lag point estimate case, tha 1985
risk range drops from 0.16—0.32 to a range of 0.14—0.28, which is
a very modest decline. If, however, all mortality components are
adjusted for changing tar levels, the corresponding 1985 risk
range becomes 0.06-0.11. The shifts for the 1991 risk estimates
follow similar patterns.
The reported risk levels are considerably higher than any of
these estimates of the risk. The results reported in Table 3 are
based on a national survey of lung cancer risk perceptions in
1985 and a North Carolina survey that I undertook in 1991, each
of which are reported in Viscusi (l992b). The national smoking
survey asked respondents how many out of 100 smokers would get
lung cancer because they smoked, where these responses been
converted to a fraction for the purposes of reporting in Table 3.
My 1991 survey questions alter this wording somewhat, asking
about the lung cancer fatality risk level rather than the lung
cancer incidence level and asking respondents about the total
smoking mortality risk.
In each case, the risk perceptions are substantial. Smokers
estimate the lung cancer risk as being 0.37 and the lung cancer
25Table 3
Summary of Smokers' Risk Perceptions
Risk Perception Full Sample Smokers
Lung cancer risk 0.43 0.37
(1985)
Lung cancer fatality risk 0.38 0.31
(1991)
Total smoking mortality risk 0.54 0.47
(1991)
Source: Viscusi (1992, pp. 69 and 77).fatality risk as 0.31, where each of these estimates is roughly
five to 10 times larger than the various adjusted lung cancer
mortality risk estimates shown in Table 3. Similarly, the
overall smoking mortality estimate of 0.47 indicates that smokers
believe the risk of death from smoking is almost a 50—50
proposition, unfavorable odds that are considerably more adverse
than any of the risk estimates shown in the final columns in
Table 2.
One particularly controversial group in society is that of
younger smokers, since many smoking critics believe that these
individuals will begin smoking at a young age and be discouraged
by the transactions costs of changing smoking from altering their
behavior. Whereas the popular belief is that the young
underassess the risk of smoking, in fact the opposite is the
case. Indeed, younger smokers overestimate the risks by more
than do their senior counterparts. In the case of the 1985
national survey, respondents aged 16—21 assessed the average lung
cancer risk as being 0.49, or a value that is 0.06 greater than
that for society as a whole. Smokers in this younger age group
assess the lung cancer risks as being 0.45, which is 0.08 greater
than that of the entire smoking population. These results are
not entirely surprising since they reflect the different mix of
smoking information and the different social context of smoking
in recent years. Indeed, even pre-teens are extremely sensitive
to the potential risks of smoking as they believe almost
26unanimously that smoking is a cause of cancer.'7
The final rationality issue to be explored is whether
smokers understand the extent of the life that will be lost
should they die because of their smoking behavior. My 1991
estimates of the life expectancy loss indicate that the overall
societal assessment of the expected loss in life expectancy due
to smoking is 11.5 years, with smokers assessing the expected
life expectancy loss at 9.0 years. Based on the original 1988
estimates of the mortalities shown in Figure 2, one calculates a
scientific reference point of an expected life expectancy loss of
10.9 years for smoking females and 6.9 years for smoking
males. These figures are below the assessed life expectancy
loss amounts. Adjustments for tar and cigarette consumption
levels by making the same proportional adjustments to the
mortality loss as for total smoking mortality in Table 2 would
reduce the scientifically estimated life expectancy loss further
and increase the extent of the overestimation of the life
expectancy loss.
Overall, there is little evidence that individuals confer an
adverse externality on their future selves through their smoking
'Indeed,99 percent or more of all age groups ranging from
seven to 14 believe in the smoking lung cancer causal link. See
Viscusi (1992b) for additional discussion.
These life expectancy loss estimates are derived in
Viscusi (1992b). More recent 1993 estimates of the life
expectancy loss, given that a death is smoking-related, imply
that eight years loss of life is lost than is assumed in the
scientific reference point estimates discussed in the text.
These new data are discussed below.
27behavior. All the available empirical evidence is suggestive of
decisions being made in a rational and consistent manner.
Although this evidence is not conclusive, the diverse array of
information that we have on a wide variety of aspects of snoking
decisions, risk perceptions, and smokers' behavior in other
contexts conveys a quite consistent picture of smoking behavior.
Such behavior may have broader implications for other kinds
of externalities as well, not simply those to the smokers' future
self. Theories of the household typically assume that the
household heads make decisions on behalf not only of themselves
but also on behalf of other family members. Thus, the husband or
wife would take into account his or her own welfare when making
the smoking behavior as well as the implications that the smoking
behavior would have for the well—being of other family
members.9 If individuals do in fact internalize these intra—
family externalities, then they will be already reflected in the
individual decisions. Rational individual decisions consequently
will imply that household externalities are internalized as well
and need not be considered. As a result, the discussion below
will indicate the value of the household externalities in the
case of environmental tobacco smoke, but it will not treat these
as societal externalities since rational smokers will internalize
these costs in making their smoking decisions. Since the cost of
these externalities will be explicitly assessed, those who wish
to undertake sensitivity analyses by classifying these costs in a
19SeeBecker (1991).
28different manner can readily do so.
6. Insurance Externalities of Smoking
A particularly controversial class of externalities linked
to smoking consists of the insurance cost effects arising from
the estimated health consequences of smoking. States such as
Mississippi are initiating law suits in attempt to recoup state
Medicare payments. Hillary Clinton and the Clinton
Administration more generally have used the argument that
cigarette smoking leads to higher health insurance costs as a
rationale for a higher cigarette tax. There has also begun to
develop a growing sense in the media that smokers are not paying
their own way.
This perception contrasts with the results of economic
studies of externalities. Assessments by Shoven, et.al. (1987),
Manning, et.al. (1989), and Gravelle and Zimmerman (1994) all
suggest that consideration of the insurance—related externalities
is more complex than many public observers have noted. In
particular, if smoking indeed leads to premature death, then
there will be competing influences. Higher health care costs may
be imposed in the short—run, but these deaths may save society
additional resources later in life since these smokers will not
be able to collect Social Security and pension benefits for the
same amount of time. Which effect is larger is an empirical
issue. Moreover, when assessing these externalities, it is
certainly not appropriate to tally only the potential adverse
consequences of smoking, such as the effects on Medicare or
29health insurance costs, and to systematically neglect the
estimated cost savings to society. Proper assessment requires
that all legitimate effects of these type be considered.
The most comprehensive study to date is that by Manning,
et.al. (1991), which also form the basis for much of the analysis
in Gravelle and Zimmerman (1994). The approach here will be to
take the Manning, et.al. (1991) study as the baseline and to
update it in a variety of ways. These revisions will include
much more than recognition of price changes through shifts in the
Consumer Price Index. Rather, using their study as a baseline,
the estimates were completely reworked to reflect the changing
cost of health insurance as well as our increased understanding
of the role of smoking. Because these changes are so extensive
and do not involve any conceptual controversies, discussion of
the procedure is relegated to the Appendix.
Table 4 reports the external insurance costs per pack of
cigarettes for two different cases, one in which there is no
adjustment for changes in tar level of cigarettes and a second in
which the tar and per capita consumption adjustment is made. The
situation in which there is no tar adjustment closely parallels
the Manning, et.al. (1991) analysis in that there is no
consideration of the changing character of cigarettes, but there
is adjustment for all the different cost factors that have
20
changed since the original Manning, et al. study.These
20 The baselineresults from Manning, et al. (1991), Table



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 adjustments are nontrivial. In the zero discount rate case,
simply updating the Manning, et.al. (1992) findings based on the
shift in the Consumer Price Index would lead the external
insurance cost per pack of cigarettes to be —$1.19, wherets after
making all the various adjustments shown in the Appendix the 1993
cost estimate at the 0 percent discount rate it is —$1.63. The
cost savings that smokers provide to society are consequently
higher with my estimates than with the simple update of the
Manning et.al. estimate. If one were to use a discount rate of 5
percent, there are net costs imposed on society, and these would
be higher under my formulation. With a tar adjustment, these
costs per pack are $0.32, whereas an update of the Manning study
would have made these costs per pack equal to $0.27.
Estimates appear in Table 4 for three different discount
rates, where the most reasonable rate corresponding to the long
run real rate of return in the U.S. economy is 3 percent. The
discount rates above and below that amount are intended to
indicate the sensitivity of the results to the discounting
assumption. For concreteness, let us focus on the results for
the 3 percent discount rate after making the tar adjustment. The
findings in Table 4 are particularly instructive in indicating
which of the externalities are most consequential. The added
cost that smokers generate in terms of medical care costs under
the age of 65 are $0.37 per pack, and there is an additional cost
of $0.18 per pack after age 65, so that the total added medical
care costs is $0.55 per pack. Sick leave costs are negligible,
31as these are under 1 cent per pack. Group life insurance also
reflects a higher cost amount since smokers die sooner than their
nonsmoking counterparts, so that this value is $0.14 per pack.
Smoking also leads to an additional cost of fires of just under
$0.02 per pack.
The main areas of cost savings are nursing home care and
retirement pensions. Since smokers die sooner, they will spend
less time in nursing homes, leading to a cost savings of $0.23
per pack. In addition, they will be collecting their pensions
and Social Security benefits for a shorter period, leading to a
cost savings of $1.19 per pack. Since smokers die sooner,
society looses the taxes it could have reaped on their earnings.
The health and Social Security tax losses from these effects
average -$0.40 per pack. The total net costs of smokers to
society are -$0.30 per pack. The fire costs in Table 4 reflect
only the insurance costs, which adjusted Manning, et al. 's (1991)
estimates to account for current estimates of fire—related
damage. Subsequently, fire-related mortality costs outside the
home will be added as well, which is another new feature of this
study.
Table 5 extends these analyses to consider various time
lags. In the case of the 30 year lag point estimates, one
obtains very similar results to what was found above. Including
lost taxes on earnings as an externality as well as the other
insurance-related costs, one has a total net cost of smokers to



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 consideration, the net externality cost at a 3 percent interest
rate is -$0.53. In effect, smokers are already paying their own
way in the sense that there is a net externality cost savings to
society from their smoking because of the cost savings arising
from their premature deaths. These figures exclude from
consideration the cigarette taxes already paid by smokers. Thus,
there is a net cost savings from the externalities as well as an
additional infusion of tax revenues from smokers. Taken at face
value, these estimates indicate that if one were to set the
Pigouvian tax amount based on the 3 percent discount rate
results, that cigarette smoking should be subsidized rather than
taxed.
7. Environmental Tobacco Smoke
Perhaps the most controversial class of external effects
pertaining to smoking is environmental tobacco smoke. Long
regarded as a nuisance by many nonsmokers, environmental tobacco
smoke health risks have now become an object of considerable
social controversy. Both the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration and members of the U.S. Congress, with thesupport
of a report by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, have
proposed taking initiatives against environmental tobacco smoke.
In each case, these agencies have suggested that there is a
causal link between environmental tobacco smoke and adverse•
health outcomes, such as lung cancer and heart disease.
In contrast, previous assessments of the external costs of
smoking have not included environmental tobacco smoke. The
33studies by Manning, et al. (1989, 1991), did not include
environmental tobacco smoke because the evidence at the time of
their study was too fragmentary to make a reliable judgemeit.
Since the time of their study, both OSHA and EPA have issued
reports with environmental tobacco smoke risk estimates baued on
this literature. Notwithstanding these agencies' willingness to
issue such judgements, other critics continue to suggest that the
linkages are not sufficiently strong or well—documented to
warrant the same kind of treatment as, for example, the risks to
the smokers themselves. The recent assessment of environmental
tobacco smoke risks by Gravelle and Zimmerman (1994) in their
Congressional Research Service study concluded, for example, that
evidence was still too inconclusive to warrant calculation of any
external costs associated with environmental tobacco smoke
exposures.
Having made these caveats, I will present estimates of the
costs imposed by environmental tobacco smoke based on the EPA and
OSHA studies.I will then adjust these estimates to account for
factors such as the change in the tar level of cigarettes that
were ignored in these government studies. Calculating these
estimates in no way implies acceptance of their validity. As a
consequence, I will review some of the most salient limitations
of these studies in the course of presenting them. Readers who
wish to make alternative judgments, such as setting these risks
equal to zero, can utilize the results presented here to
undertake the appropriate sensitivity tests.
34There are two broad classes of environmental tobacco smoke
(ETS) risks --lungcancer and heart disease. Most of the debate
in the literature has been over the validity of the lung cancer
risk estimates. Of the two classes of risk effects, these are
the better established. However, as will be indicated below,
even the lung cancer estimates are the object of substantial,
legitimate controversy. The heart disease estimates have been
regarded as being highly speculative by the authors of the heart
disease studies as well as by the agencies employing these
results. Because all parties have given less credence to the
heart disease estimates, these estimates have not been the object
of as much public discussion. However, since the heart disease
mortality rates are considerably larger than those of lung
cancer, it is important both to recognize their potential
implications as well as the limitations associated with their
estimation.
Lung Cancer Risks
The first class of ETS risks to be considered is that
associated with lung cancer. The scientific evidence that led to
the lung cancer risk assessments by EPA consisted of 11 studies
of family members exposed to ETS. Of these studies only one
showed statistically significant effects at the 10 percent
confidence level, which is a less demanding statistical test than
EPA traditionally applies. "Significant" results such as this
may occur on a random basis. Despite the fact that only one of
the studies yielded relationships that were statistically
35significant and the substantial lack of comparability among the
eleven studies, which were undertaken with data adjusted in
different ways and collected from the l960s through 1988, EPA
pooled the estimates to make an overall ETS risk assessment.
Even based on EPA's risk estimates, the ETS risks are at least
two orders of magnitude smaller than the risks to smokers
themselves.
These estimates neglected a variety of fundamental aspects
of the risk. They did not, for example, account for the change
in the tar content or per smoker consumption of cigarettes over
time. These adjustments will be made below, using the same
weighting system of the studies adopted 127 EPA. Another
principal drawback of the ETS studies is that they pertain to
risks to other household members. Those exposed to public ETS
will typically be exposed to lower concentrations of ETS as well
as shorter durations of exposures than the family members of a
smoker. To the extent that there is a no risk threshold, low
levels of exposure to ETS may cause no risk whatsoever to the
exposed population.
The character of the studies also is quite different from
what economists might envision. There were, for example, no
detailed multivariate controls to capture differences in
demographic characteristics or location, though some studies did
make a few primitve demographic adjustments. If smokers choose
to live in highly polluted areas, and if they and their families
get lung cancer because of their broader environmental exposures,
36this type of relationship would be captured in these studies and
incorrectly attributed to ETS. Similarly, smokers will be more
likely to be married to other smokers. Higher mortality rates
from ETS may reflect smoking behavior of other family members
rather than ETS. Intra-family correlations in exposure to risks
and risk-taking propensities will tend to produce spurious
correlations.
The nature of the research results is also difficult to
interpret. One recent study "found no adverse effect of exposure
to environmental tobacco smoke during adulthood, including
exposure to a spouse who smoked."2' Whether the apparent ETS
risk to children arises from exposure during pregnancy to a
smoking mother or ETS exposure after birth is unclear.
In some instances, inconsistent research results have been
treated in a way that reflects advocacy of an ETS—cancer link
rather than a scientific assessment of causality. One 1992 study
found that spouses of low and moderate smokers had a 30 percent
lower probability of lung cancer, whereas spouses of heavier
smokers had a 30 percent higher probability of lung cancer.22
Although the authors stress the latter finding, taken at face
value their results imply an implausibly shaped dose—response
relationship between ETS and cancer that is initially negative
and then positive.
21See Janerich, et al. (1990).
22 Thisexample is drawn from Robert J. Barro, "Send
Regulations Up in Smoke," Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1994.
37In making its estimate of the number of people exposed to
ETS, EPA also understates the extent to which workers have
already been prevented from being exposed to ETS, thus
overstating the potential risk. Many workplaces have installed
special smoking lounges and banned workplace smoking. EPA may
underestimate the number of workers covered by bans since larger
establishments are most likely to have bans or designated smoking
areas (74 percent of firms with 750 or more employees versus 55
percent with 50-99 employees) .EPA,however, did not adjust
for workplace size. The EPA estimates recognize only the
efficacy of the 20 percent of the smoking lounges that me*t the
strict standards proposed recent legislation (HR3434). However,
if the other lounges have some partial efficacy, than one would
want to take this influence into account. As a result, I will
also explore the sensitivity of the results to the assumption one
makes about the prevalence of bans and effective smoking lounges.
A final caveat that will be noted before considering the
risk estimates is that there is an inconsistency between the EPA
and OSHA risk estimates.24 EPA estimates that each year 2,200
people die from lung cancer due to ETS exposures. When analyzing
deaths in the workplace, OSHA estimates that 140—722 deaths per
year arise from workplace exposures. In this case, OSHA did not
235ee EPA (1994), Exhibit 7—1.
24TheEPA estimates appear on p.12 of EPA (1994), and the
OSHA estimates appear on p.16011 of the Federal Register. The
OSHA figures pertain to the average number of lung cancers over
the next 45 years whereas the EPA estimates pertain to the
current risk estimates.
38follow EPA's procedure of pooling the results of the risk studies
irrespective of their statistical significance. These numbers
can be linked, as EPA estimates that 82 percent of non-home
exposures occur at work. If one were to apply this workplace
exposure estimate to the OSHA mortality estimate, one obtains an
OSHA-based risk estimate of 171-880 lung cancer deaths from non—
home exposures. Thus, there is considerable inconsistency within
the Federal Government in the assessment of the lung cancer risk
levels.
To obtain the estimate of the value of statistical lives, I
utilized the $5 million value per statistical life from Viscusi
(1992a, 1993). This value is the midpoint estimate of the
estimated value of life range based on wage—risk tradeoffs. This
value of life is pertinent for a worker with an average life
expectancy of 36.5 years that will be lost because of an injury.
In contrast, an individual who contracts lung cancer because of
ETS exposures will incur much less of a loss in life expectancy
than would a worker suffering an acute injury. The average life
expectancy loss for a victim of a smoking—related disease is 12.1
years.25 For concreteness, I have used the discounted estimated
life expectancy loss for smokers in making the calculation.
Thus, the pertinent value of life is $5 million, multiplied by
the ratio of the discounted expected life years lost from smoking
divided by the discounted expected number of life years lost by a
worker. One should also, however, adjust this lost value for the
25SeeCenter for Disease Control (1993).
39fact that it is deferred. People exposed to environmental
tobacco smoke are not killed instantaneously so that there must
be appropriate recognition of the time lags involved in making
these assessments.
Table 6 provides three sets of estimates. Panel 1 in the
table provides estimates based on EPA risk assessments, and the
bottom panel provides estimates derived by extrapolating the OSHA
ETS risk estimates for the workplace. Within the Panel 1, the
bottom two sections adjust for the discrepancy between EPA's
estimate of the number of people at risk and the estimated number
of people at risk derived from the OSHA study. All risk
assessments in Panel 1 are based on EPA estimates. In contrast,
Panel 2 in Table 6 utilizes both the OSHA risk estimates and
estimates of the population at risk based on OSHA's assessment.
For each of these estimates, the columns indicate the differing
assumptions that have been made with respect to the tar level of
cigarettes. The first column pertains to that in which the ETS
studies correctly capture the tar levels. The next two columns
reflect the estimates for which there is a 20 year moving average
that determines the risk level and for which it is the 20 year
lagged point estimate that determines the risk. The final two
columns present estimates for the 30 year moving average and 30
year lag case.
The first two rows in the table indicate the total number of
lung cancer deaths and the associated costs attributable to ETS
using the EPA assumptions in which there is no tar adjustment.
40Table 6
Lung Cancer Deaths Caused by ETS Outside the Home.
Panel I Tar Level Assumption LInking Risk to Exposures
20 yr. 30 yr.
Moving20 yr. PointMovIng30 yr. Point
No Lag Average Estimate Average Estimate
EPA-Based Estimates
Number of Deaths 1694 1.694 1.694 1.694 1694
Cost ($ bilhons) $2.80 $1.53 $0.83 $1.05 $0.45
WIth 50% Tar Adjustment:
Numberof Deaths 1,389 1,285 1,279 1,247 1220
Cost($bilhons) S2.29 $1.16 $.63 $077 $0.32
WIth 100% Tar Adjustment:
Number of Deaths 1,171 864 696 748 525
Cost (5 Billions) $1.19 $0.78 $0.34 $0.46 $0.14
OSHA.Based Estimate - Lower Bound
With 50% Tar Adjustment:
Number of Deaths 444 501 409 399 390
Cost (5 billions) $0.74 $0.44 $0.20 $0.24 $0.10
WIth 100% Tar Adjustment:
Number of Deaths 374 338 223 239 168
Cost (S Billions) $0.62 $0.31 $0.11 $0.15 $0.04
OSHA-Based Estimate - Upper Bound
With 50% Tar Adjustment:
Number of Deaths 1,150 1.296 1,059 1,032 1,010
Cost (5 billions) $1.89 $1.17 $0.52 $0.64 $0.27
WIth 100% Tar Adjustment:
Number of Deaths 970 872 577 620 434
Cost (S Billions) $1.60 $0.79 $0.28 $0.39 $0.12
EPA number at risk 69.1 million (EPA 92)
EPA number at risk with 23% restrictions = 53.2 million
OSHA number at risk = 14.0 to 36.1 million (OSHA 94- p.16007)
Panel 2 Estimates of Workplace Risk Based on OSHA Estimates
Tar Level Assumption Unking Risk to Exposures
ZOyr. 3Oyr.
Moving 20 yr. PointMovIng30 yr. Point
No Lag Average Estimate Average Estimate
Lower Bound
Number of Deaths 171 171 171 171 171
Cost (5 billions) $0.28 $0.15 $0.08 $0.11 $0.05
Upper Bound
Number of Deaths 880 880 880 880 880
Cost (5 Billions) $1.46 $0.79 $0.43 $0.55 $0.23
Note: EPA (1994- p.12) says 18% of ETS exposure occurs at the worksite
and another 4% occurs at other covered locations outside the home.
This implies that 82% of non-home exposure occurs at the worksite.
These data are used to extrapolate the OSHA workplace risk estimates
to the entire population.
For reference purposes, the lung cancer estimates embodied in the OSI4A
estimates appear above.
See appendix for how tar adjustment factors are derived for the differing assumptions
regarding latency periods.The mortality estimate is a constant value of 1,694 in all cases,
but the monetized value of the lives lost differs because the
time frame affects the discounted value of the these losses,
where a discount rate of three percent is used throughout. The
next set of rows indicates the mortality costs if one makes an
adjustment for half of the reduction in tar levels and 100
percent of the reduction. If nonsmokers benefit to the same
extent as do smokers from the decreased tar levels, then the 100
percent estimates are pertinent. If, however, they beneftted
from only 50 percent of the reduction in tar, only half the
change in tar levels is relevant. To the extent that the
improvements in tar are achieved through devices such as filters
rather than changes in the composition of cigarettes, there would
tend to be less than a 100 percent effect.
For purposes of illustration, consider the middle 20 year
point estimate set of results. The original EPA estimate of
1,694 deaths is reduced to 1,279 if half of the change in tar
levels is accounted for and 696 of the entirety of the tar change
is recognized. The value of the mortality costs changes
similarly, as it decreases from $0.88 billion in the base EPA
case to $0.67 billion in the 50 percent reduction case, and $0.36
billion jn the 100 percent reduction case.
If instead one utilizes the EPA risk estimates in
conjunction with the OSHAnumberat risk, one obtains
considerably lower estimates of the mortality cost. For the 100
percent tar adjustment case, estimates based on the low end of
41the OSHA risk assessment are 223 deaths and a monetary cost of
$0.12 billion, with the high estimate being 577 deaths and $0.30
billion.
Table 7 adjusts the outside the home ETS lung cancer
estimates assuming that current smoking restrictions are 50
percent effective rather than EPA's assumption that restrictions
are 23 percent effective.26 If these adjustments are made, then
one obtains estimates itt Table 7 which are roughly two-thirds the
size of those in the top Panel 1 of Table 6.27 The OSHA-based
estimates in Table 7 reflect the population adjustment not OSHA's
risk value adjustment. If additional restrictions on smoking in
the workplace are enacted, as would be the case if OSHA enacts
its proposed regulation banning workplace smoking except in
designated areas, then these estimates would of course be
dramatically reduced even further.
In much the same manner, one can calculate the lung cancer
deaths caused by ETS inside the home. Table 8 provides these
estimates. There are no OSHA-based estimates for this table
since osH.. did not address risks within the home. For the EPA-
based risk estimates there will be 800 deaths per year within the
home. Making the 50 percent tar adjustment reduces these
estimates by an average of about one-fourth, and making the 100
26 U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency (1994), p. 28. Also
see notes to Table 4.
27 Panel2 in Table 6 is not adjusted since OSHA did not
indicate its smoking restriction for the underlying risk
estimates.
42Table 7
LungCancerDeaths Caused by ETS Outside the Home
With anAssumptionof 50% Effectiveness of Current Restrictions
Numberof Deaths and Discounted Cost of Deaths (Billions of Dollars)
20yr. 30yr.
Moving20 yr. PointMoving30 yr. Point
No Lag Averacie Estimate Average Estimate
EPA Estimate (based on EPA 94 estimate of 1,694 deaths)
With 50% Tar Adjustment:
Number of Deaths 902 834 831 810 792
Cost (S billions) $1.50 $0.75 $0.40 $0.51 $0.21
With 100% Tar Adjustment:
Number of Deaths 760 561 452 486 341
Cost (5 Billions) 51.25 $0.51 $0.23 $0.31 $0.09
OSHA-Based Estimate - Lower Bound
With 50% Tar Adjustment:
Number of Deaths 236 267 218 212 208
Cost (5 billions) $0.40 $0.24 $0.10 $0.13 $0.06
With 100% Tar Adjustment:
Numberof Deaths 199 180 119 127 90
Cost (5 Billions) $0.33 $0.17 $0.06 $0.07 $0.02
OSHA-8ased Estimate - Upper Bound
With 50% Tar Adjustment:
Number of Deaths 612 690 564 549 538
Cost (S billions) $1.01 $0.62 $0.27 $0.34 $0.14
With 100% Tar Adjustment:
Number of Deaths 516 464 307 330 231
Cost (5 Billions) $0.66 $0.42 $0.15 $0.20 $0.06
See appendix for how tar adjustment factors are derived for the differing assumptions
regarding latency periods.Table 7 continued
Note: The first two panels of Table 6 assumed that 23% of
worksites (EPA 1994) are currently subject to restrictions
comparable to those proposed by the EPA. Table 7 incorporates
evidence that the EPA underestimated the number of persons
subject to these restrictions and assumes that 50% of workplaces
are currently covered. The reasoning for this is as follows.
First, the EPA data suggest that 59% of worksites with more
than 50 employees are subject to smoking bans or have effective
smoking lounges. This is used as evidence that 59% of persons
working at these sites are subject to these restrictions. This
conclusion is not valid, however, because there is a direct
correlation between worksite size and smoking restrictions (with
74% restrictions for the largest worksites). Since there are
more persons working at these larger worksites (and, thus,
subject to the greater restriction), one would expect that more
than 59% of the persons in this category would be subject to
restrictions.
Second, the EPA assumes that 10% of all worksites with fewer
than 50 persons are subject to similar restrictions. This
estimate appears to be arbitrary given that there is no available
data for these firms. A reasonable extrapolation of rates from
worksites with greater than 50 persons would lead to a much
higher estimate.
Third, the EPA only includes smoking lounges that would meet
the standards of their proposed rule. This is only 20% of all
smoking lounges. The other 80% also afford nonsmokers some
protection, which is not recognized by EPA.
Finally, the data used is from 1992, but the policy would
not be implemented until 1995 at the earliest. Normally this
discrepancy would be considered insignificant. In this case,
however, there is already a strong trend toward private (and
local public) restriction. Restrictive smoking policies
increased from 27% in 1985 to 59% in 1992.
Given the magnitude of the errors in the EPA analysis, 50%
restrictions may be a conservative estimate.Table 8
Lung Cancer Deaths Caused by ETS Inside the Home.
Number of Deaths and Discounted cost of Deaths (Billions of Dollars)
20 yr. 30 yr.
Moving20 yr. PointMoving30 yr. Point
No Lag Average Estimate Averaae Estimate
EPA-Based Estimate
Number of Deaths 800 800 800 800 800
Cost (S billions 51.32 50.72 $0.39 $0.50 $0.21
With 50% Ia, Adjustment:
Number of Deaths 656 607 604 589 576
Cost($billions) $1.08 $0.55 $0.30 $0.36 $0.15
With 100% Tar Adjustment:
Number of Deaths 553 408 329 353 248
Cost (5 Billions) $0.91 $0.37 $0.16 $0.22 $0.06
The base figure is from the U.S. EPA (1994).
See the appendix for how tar adjustment factors are derived for the differing assumptions
regarding latency periods.percent tar adjustment reduces the estimates by an average of
about one-half. It should be emphasized that including any lung
cancer death risk estimate inside the home within an externality
assessment is problematic since these costs may be internalized
by the smoker who takes into account the well—being of family
members in making the smoking decision.
Heart Disease
The overall mortality costs associated with the ETS—heart
disease linkage are even greater. EPA estimates that from 8,760-
17,520 deaths per year from heart disease are due to ETS
exposures outside the home.
Although these estimates are higher than those for lung
cancer, they are based on much weaker scientific evidence.
Indeed, the recent study by Steenland (1992) that provides the
scientific basis for EPA's estimates includes a myriad of caveats
and cautionary notes that should make one reluctant to attach
28 much precision to these estimates.To deal with what the
28 Inparticular, Steenland (1992) makes the following
observations: "While the lung cancer risk among never—smokers
exposed to ETS is well established, a possible risk of heart
disease due to ETS is more controversial. (p. 94)
Environmental tobacco smoke is difficult to measure directly. (p.
94) ...Therelative contribution of ETS exposure at work to
total exposure is not well known. (p. 94) ...Theprincipal
weaknesses in the epidemiologic evidence to date have been the
indirect methods of assessing exposure (via spousal smoking) and
the lack of data on exposures to ETS outside the home. (p. 95)
Also, there are many risk factors for heart disease, and it
is difficult to control well for all of them. Another problem
with the epidemiologic data is the seemingly large effect that
ETS has on heart disease compared with the effect of mainstream
smoking. (p. 95) ...Theyshowed no excess of lung cancer, and
cross-sectional smoking data revealed smoking habits similar to
the U.S. referent population. Hence, increased cigarette smoking
43author termed "considerable uncertainty" regarding the results,
EPA simply scaled down the mortality estimates. It should also
be noted that although EPA adopted the Steenland (1992) findings,
it did not adopt Steenland's result that 55 percent of heart
disease deaths are due to non-house exposures, but instead
adopted a 73 percent assumption, which would lead to a higher
estimated public externality.
The EPA estimates of heart disease also suffer from the same
classes of deficiencies as did the lung cancer risk estimates.
In particular, they did not take into account the lag time
between exposure and the onset of disease, and they abstracted
from changes in the tar level and composition of cigarettes.
Table 9 summarizes the heart disease mortality estimates
that will occur outside the home. In each case, low and high
estimates based on the EPA assumptions are presented, and the
table also includes low and high estimates based on OSHA's
estimates of the mortality costs of ETS. The annual death count
in every instance is much higher than the lung cancer mortality
rate. If one uses the non—home exposure amount advocated by
was unlikely to explain the excess heart disease risk. (p. 96)
A number of assumptions are involved in estimating the heart
disease mortality due to ETS, adding an unfortunate level of
uncertainty. The most important assumption is that the relative
risks for ETS and heart disease, derived from the epidemiologic
evidence, are reasonable accurate. The epidemiologic results may
be questioned, given the inherent uncertainties of any
epidemiologic study. (p. 98) ...Considerableuncertainty is
involved in extrapolating from the epidemiologic data, which
consider the relative risks for never—smokers living with
smokers, to estimating relative risks for those exposed to ETS
(anywhere) vs those truly not exposed (anywhere). (p. 98)"
44Table 9
Mortality Costs Outside the Home Due to
Heart Disease
Numberof Deaths and Discounted Costof Deaths (B9Ilonsof Do8ass)
NoLag 10 yr. MA 10 yr. Point 20yr. MA 20 yr. Point 30 yr. MA30 yr. Point
EPA (1994)
with73%Nom. Exposures
Low 8,760 6,760 8,760 8,760 8,760 8.760 8,760
$14.45 $10.41 $7.88 $7.88 $4.28 $5.43
50% Tar 8,560 8,285 7,645 7,581 6,813 7,094 5,926
$14.12 $9.85 $8.88 $6.82 $3.33 $4.40 $1.57
100% Tar 8,360 7,810 6,529 6,402 4,867 5,427 3,092
$13.80 $9.28 $5.87 $5.76 $2.38 $3.38 $082
Nigh 17,520 17,520 17,520 17,520 17,520 17,520 17,520
$28.91 $20.83 $15.76 $15.76 $858 $10.85 $4.83
50% Tar 17,120 18,570 15.289 15,162 13,627 14,187 11,852
$28.25 $19.70 $13.75 $13.64 $8.67 $8.78 $3.13
100% Tar 16.721 15,621 13,058 12,804 9,733 10.854 6,184
$27.59 $18.57 $11.75 $11.52 $4.77 $6.72 $1.84
with55%Nor*orneExposures
Low 6,600 6,600 6,600 6,600 6,600 8,600 6,600
$10.90 $7.85 $5.93 $5.93 $3.23 $4.09 $1.75
50% Tar 6,449 6,242 5,760 5,712 5,133 5,344 4.466
$10.85 $7.42 $5.18 $5.14 $2.52 $3.31 $1.18
100% Tar 6,299 5,884 4.919 4,824 3,667 4,069 2,329
$10.40 $7.00 $4.42 $4.34 $1.60 $2.54 $0.82
High 13,200 13,200 13,200 13,200 13,200 13.200 13,200
$21.78 $15.69 $11.87 $11.88 $6.46 $8.17 $3.49
50% Tar 12,899 12,484 11,519 11.424 10,267 10.689 8,929
$21 .28 $14.84 $10.36 $10.28 $5.02 $8.62 $2.36
100% Tar 12,598 11,769 9,838 9,647 7,333 8,178 4,650
$20.76 $13.99 $8.85 $8.68 $3.59 $5.06 $1.23
OSHA (1994)
Low 2,554 2,554 2,554 2,554 2.554 2,554 2,554
$4.21 $3.03 $2.30 $2.30 $1.25 $1.58 $0.67
50% Tar 2.554 2,514 2,450 2,375 2,110 2.221 1,958
$4.21 $2.99 $2.21 $2.14 $1.03 $1.37 $0.52
100% Tar 2,554 2.475 2,347 2,196 1,665 1,889 1,362
$4.21 $2.94 $2.11 $1.98 $0.81 $1.17 $0.36
Hiçh 15,855 15,855 15,855 15,855 15,855 15.855 15.656
326 16 $18.64 $14.25 $14.27 $7.76 $9.82 $4.19
50% Tar 15.855 15,611 15,213 14,744 13,096 13,790 12,155
$2616 $18.55 $1368 $13.27 $6.41 $8.54 $3.22
I(X)% Tar 15,555 15,368 14,571 13,634 10,340 11,726 8.456
$2616 $1826 $13.10 $12.27 $5.06 $7.26 $2.24Table 9 continued
Note: The OSHA estimates are based on a 45 year average.
OSHAfiguresfrom p.16011, Federal Register, April 5, 1994. The
OSRAestimateswere adjusted to account for EPA's assumption that
82% of all exposures are at the worksites. See discussion of
Table 6 for further details. The EPA tar adjustment is limited
to base year of 1988, which is the year of the heart disease
study by Wells (1988) used by EPA. The OSHA tar adjustments are
based on 1994 tar levels with an assumption that OSHA risk levels
are contemporaneous. See appendix for how tar adjustment factors
are derived for differing assumptions regarding latency periods.
The no tar, 50% tar and 100% tar figures are derived by
dividing the base numb'r of deaths (and the cost of deaths) by
the modified tar adjustment figures. The modification for no tar
and 50% tar are best illustrated through an example. A 100% tar
adjustment figure of 1.5 would only be 1.25 under the 50%
assumption and 1 under a no tar assumption.
The 73% nonhome exposure case is taken from EPA 1994. The
55% nonhome exposure case is from Steenland (1992).Steenland (1992) of 55 percent rather than the 73 percent
estimate utilized by EPA, one reduces the mortality estimate and
associated costs. Both cases appear in Table 9.
The discounted cost associated with these deaths has a value
ranging from $4.6 billion to $9.2 billion in the 20 year point
estimate case where these estimates are based on the assumption
that the extent of life lost due to heart disease from ETS
exposures is the same as the life expectancy loss attributable to
smoking overall. If one adopts a 100 percent tar adjustment,
there estimates decline to $2.5 billion —$5.1billion. The
other columns in Table 9 represent other tar lag situations,
ranging from no lag between EPA studies and tar levels, to the
case in which there is a 30 year lag time. The importance of
these lags is apparent, as the 30 year point estimates of the
costs are considerably below the values in the situation in which
there is no lag.
Table 10 presents analogous findings for heart disease
deaths caused by ETS inside the home. Results appear assuming 27
percent of exposures are inside the home (EPA'S assumption and 45
percent (Steenland estimate). These mortality amounts are also
substantial, as the death count range even in the lowest scenario
presented is 3,240 annual deaths. Even with a 30 year lag before
these deaths occur, the mortality costs are $1.25 billion if one
makes no tar adjustment. As with the public ETS risks, tar
adjustments substantially decrease these values.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total Annual Social Costs
insurance Externalities ($ billions),
assuming 3% discount rate
No Lag 20 yr. MA 20 yr. point30yr. MA 30 yr. point
NoTar Adjustment
Smoke?s Insurance Externalities ($7.43) ($7.43) ($7.43) ($7.43) ($7.43)
ETS Externalities Insurance
Low ($0.25) ($0.25) ($0.25) ($0.25) ($0.25)
Median ($0.36) ($0.36) ($0.36) ($0.36) ($0.36)
High ($0.46) ($0.46) ($0.46) ($0.46) ($0.46)
Tar Adjusted
Smokers Insurance Externalities ($7.79) ($6.74) ($6.26) ($6.32) ($5.65)
ETS Externalities Insurance
Low ($0.26) ($0.23) ($0.21) ($0.21) ($0.19)
Median ($0.37) ($0.32) ($0.30) ($0.30) ($0.27)
High ($0.48) ($0.42) ($0.39) ($0.39) ($0.35)
ETS Mortality Smoking Costs
No Lag 20 yr. MA 20 yr. point30 yr. MA 30 yr. point
LungCancer
(non-home)Low $0.28 $0.15 $0.06 $0.11 $0.02
Median $1.25 $0.62 $0.27 $0.34 $0.12
High $2.80 $1.53 $0.83 $1.05 $0.45
Heart Disease
(non-home)Low $4.21 $1.98 $0.81 $1.17 $0.36
Median $12.10 $5.88 $3.20 $4.05 $1.73
High $27.59 $15.76 $8.58 $10.85 $463
Fire Deaths
No Lag20 yr. MA 20 yr. point 30 yr. MA 30 yr. point
(non-residential) $0.03 $0.03 $0.03 $0.03 $0.03Table 11 continued
Note: Smoker's insurance externalities are taken from Tables
4 and 5, and are multiplied by the number of packs consumed in
the U.S. (The Tobacco Institute, 1994).
ETS insurance externalities are found by dividing ETS deaths
by total smoker's deaths due to smoking (CDC 1993) and
multiplying this fraction with smoker's insurance externalities.
Costs of ETS deaths from lung cancer are the low, median,
and high figures from Tables 6 and 7. Costs of heart disease are
the low, median, and high numbers from Table 9. The low, median
and high numbers for each category (no lag, 20 year MA, etc.) are
found by visual inspection except where the median is anaverage
of the two closest figures. For example, the no lag, heart
disease numbers from Table 9 would be: low$4.21, median$17.62
((14.45+20.78)/2), and high=$28.9l.
Non-residential fire deaths are for 1990 (FEMA 1993) and are
valued at $5 million dollars per death.3 percent discount rate. These are the ETS values that will be
used in calculating the total externality costs of cigarettes.
These categories of costs are considered: insurance
externalities, ETS mortality costs, and fire—related mortality.
The inside-the-home heart disease death estimates are excluded
for two reasons. First, deaths inside the home may well be
internalized by the smoker and consequently are not
externalities. Second, as in the case of the other heart disease
estimates, the underlying scientific basis for these estimates is
extremely fragile and highly speculative. The low and high
estimates are quite disparate, so the assumptions one adopts are
consequential. For the median estimates and a 20 year point
estimate for the tar adjustment, the net ETS cost is 27 cents per
pack, virtually all of which is due to heart disease costs.
Table 11 also adds the costs of nonresidential fire—related
mortality. These calculations assumed a value of life of $5
million.
8. Conclusion: The Net Externality Costs of Smoking
At the current time, smokers pay an average of $0.53 per
pack in cigarette taxes. If our objective is to set an
appropriate tax level to reflect the externalities generated by
cigarettes, the question then becomes whether this tax amount is
sufficient to address the externality costs imposed.
These costs consist of several potential elements. The
first of these, the externalities to the smoker's future self
appear to be unimportant.. Very few smokers underestimate the
46hazards associated with smoking, and indeed overall smokers
overassess the risks of smoking. To the extent that smokers also
internalize the ETS risks to household members, this effect would
be captured as well in these private decisions.
The focal point of the externality cost debate has nat been
losses to the smokers' future selves but on the health insurance
and related costs associated with smoking. A comprehensive
assessment of these costs suggests that on balance smokers do not
cost society resources because of their smoking activities, but
rather save society money. Evidence presented in Section 6
indicates that at reasonable rates of discount the cost scvings
that results because of the premature deaths of smokers through
their lower Social Security and pension costs will more than
compensate for the added costs imposed by smokers, chiefly
through higher health insurance costs. Thus, not only is there
not a rationale for imposing a tax due to these insurance-related
externalities, but rather on balance there is a net cost savings
to society even excluding consideration of the current cigarette
taxes paid by smokers.
The principal externality cost component that might provide
the impetus for a cigarette tax consists of ETS costs.
Environmental tobacco smoke, however, is now the target of a
wide-range of explicit regulatory proposals that would limit
public exposures to ETS. Legislation before Congress would ban
smoking in public places. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration has proposed a regulation that would ban smoking
47in the workplace except in situations where a designated smoking
are meeting stringent ventilation conditions was provided. If
these measures are enacted, it would not be appropriate to
consider the current levels of externals cost of ETS in setting
the appropriate tax level because the public externalities would
have been addressed by an alternative policy tool, direct
regulation.
If, however, we proceed under the assumption that these
measures will not be enacted, then the costs associated with ETS
are potentially very large, if one accepts the very imprecise
scientific risk judgments of EPA and OSHA. If one takes these
types of estimates at face value and incorporates them in a net
tally of the combined externalities associated with smoking,
including the cost of ETS as well as all the insurance-related
costs, one obtains the net cost figures indicated in Table 12.29
The top panel of Table 12 indicates the cost with no tar
adjustments and the bottom panel indicates the tar—adjusted cost.
Based on the 30 year point estimates and the median risk
29Thefigures in Table 12 are calculated as the sum of
insurance externalities, passive smoking costs, passive smoking
insurance externalities, and nonresidential fire deaths.
Insurance externalities are computed as the estimates from Table
5 times the number of packs sold in 1993 (The Tobacco Institute,
1993, p.6). Passive smoking costs are assessed as the low,
median, and high numbers from Tables 6,7 (lung cancer), and 9
(heart disease). Passive smoking insurance externalities are
estimated as the insurance externalities figure times the number
of deaths due to passive smoking divided by the total number of
smoking attributable deaths (CDC 1994). The value of
nonresidential fire deaths is calculated as the number of
nonresidential fire deaths in 1990 (Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 1993) times the unadjusted value of life figure.
48Table 12
Summaryof ExternalCosts of Smoking
This table is derived by summing the costs found in table 11. Cost per pack is found by
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20 yr. MA 20
Cost per Pack
yr. point 30 yr. MA30 yr. point
($0.14) ($0.20) ($0.23) ($0.18) ($0.20)
$0.21 ($0.02) ($0.12) ($0.01)assumptions, without a tar adjustment smokers on balance save
society $0.14 per pack even including ETS costs. In the tar—
adjusted case smoking is a break-even proposition. Even the
worst case scenario shown in the table in which there is no lag
between smoking and the observed effects yields as a high
estimate in the no tar adjustment case a value of $0.43 per pack,
which is an amount below current cigarette tax levels. As a
consequence cigarette taxes already exceed the level of the
estimated externalities.
It should be emphasized that these calculations were
extremely conservative in that they included the very highly
speculative ETS estimates. The high end of the range in effect
takes the EPA estimates of the ETS risks at face value. Indeed,
all the estimates presented here recognized a substantial ETS
component even though one might have reasonably set these costs
equal to zero, as in all previous smoking externality studies.
These risks are highly debated and uncertain in the case of the
lung cancer-ETS risk, and the evidence for the heart disease—ETS
risk is at such a preliminary stage that the risk estimates
border on being conjecture. However, even if we were to accept
the highly uncertain risk estimates that have been put forth, the
overall conclusion with respect to need for a higher cigarette
tax is not affected. Although consideration of the ETS effects
leads to a substantial shift in the externality cost estimates
from all previous studies of this issue, overall cigarette taxes
exceed the associated externalities.
49Appendix
The basic building block for the insurance—related
externality cost estimates presented in Section 6 consisted of
the results reported in Chapter 4 of Manning, et. al. (1991).
See, in particular, Table 4-15. This study provided a
comprehensive assessment of the external cost of smoking }y using
the Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) Data and the National
Health Interview Survey (NHIS) data. In their study, the authors
attempted to avoid contaminating the smoking estimates by purging
the data of systematic differences between smokers and non-
smokers other than their smoking status. In doing this they
created a "non—smoking smoker" stylized individual for use in
their analyses. The procedure to be described here does not
alter the fundamental structure of their assessment, but instead
undertakes a large number of revisions in their estimates, most
of which were price-related but some of which pertain to more
fundamental considerations such as the adjustments for tar levels
in cigarettes and per capita cigarette consumption. For ease of
reference, these amendments of their analysis are distinguished
by topic below.
Medical Care
In the case of medical care expenses for those under age 65,
the adjustment figure used is the real rate of medical cost
increase since the period of their data. For this age range, the
Manning, et al. (1991) data is taken from the HIE (1975) so the
pertinent adjustment factor to bring the costs to 1993 dollars is
501.585 (medical cost index taken from Statistical Abstract of the
United States 1993 and World Almanac and Book of Facts. 1994).
For individuals age 65 and over the data in Manning et.al. (1991)
is from the NHIS (1983), leading to an adjustment factor
calculated similarly to that for those under 65 of 1.3922.
Sick Leave
Manning, et al. (1991) computed the sick leave costa using
data in NHIE and NHIS. Manning, et al. used HIE for men under 65
years of age, while they used NHIS for men 65 and older. All the
data for women was taken from NHIS, where NHIS data was used in
conjunction with 1985 CPS data to determine individual wage
rates. Manning, et al. assumed that 38 percent of the work loss
was covered by sick leave.
Based on the information included in Appendix G of Manning,
et al. (1992), 97 percent of the earnings for men occur before
age 65. As a result, 97 percent of men's earnings levels were
updated from 1975 and three percent were updated from 1985, while
100 percent of the women's earnings were updated from the year
1985.
To adjust the sick leave figures, the employment cost index,
as reported in Emlovment Cost Indexes. 1975-1992, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, 1993, p. 21 was used.
After obtaining the estimates for women and men, data from the
Statistical Abstract of the Unites States. 1993 (p. 402) were
used to obtain updated proportions of women and men in the
workforce, which were then used to assess the weighted average of
51the worktorce mix. Manning, et al. 's assumption that 38 percent
of the work loss is covered by sick leave was left unchanged.
Group Life Insurance
Group coverage per worker is estimated by Manning, et al.
(1991) to be $19,300, which in 1992 dollars is $24,195. In 1992
there were 117.598 million workers, and total group life
insurance coverage in the United States was estimated to. be
$4,240,919 (kmerican Council of Life Insurance in World Almanac
and Book of Facts, 1994).
Nursing Home Care
Manning states that 4.79 percent of the population over 65
is in nursing homes and that $9,247 ($12,191 in 1993 dollars) is
the annual covered cost per patient. In 1990, 5.09 percent of
the population over 65 was in nursing homes (U.S. Department of
Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1993 and
Wo1d Almanac and Book of Facts. 1994). In addition to adjusting
for the changing nursing home population, there is also an
adjustment for the cost of nursing home care. In 1990 the
covered cost per patient was $21,290 (amount in 1993 dollars
following the same procedure as above).
Retirement Pensions
In estimating the costs of pensions, Manning, et al. (1991)
included Social Security, Supplemental Security Income (SSI),
public assistance, veteran's compensation, and pension income
(using 1985 data). To address trends in these amounts, estimates
were obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor, Trends in
52Pensions, 1992 and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Annual Statistical Supplement of the Social Security Bulletin,
1993. The updated figures are for 1992.
Trends in the proportion of the population covered by these
programs were also taken into account. A weighted average
(weights based on gross outlays of these programs) of the
percentage change of those over 65 receiving payments was used to
derive the adjustment factor. To calculate the cost adjustment
factor, the weighted real increase in the value of payments made
to recipients was used.
Fires
Manning, et al. (1991) estimate that fires caused by smokers
lead to $405.14 million in damages (1990 dollars converted from
1986 dollars) .Accordingto FEMA(Firein the United States:
1983—1990, National Fire Data Center, FEMA,1993).In 1990,
there were $354.5 million in damages attributable to smokers.
Taxes on Earnings
Manning, et al. used the 1985 CPS to determine earnings
received. This figure was updated using information from the
employment cost index, which appears in the U.S. Department of
Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1993.
Taxes on earnings were calculated as being the amount that
an individual would pay toward the above costs. It was
calculated in such a way that taxes collected equal costs. Since
Manning, et al. 's (1991) analysis, total costs have risen by 40
percent. However, the demographics of smoking have changed so
53that the non-smoking smoker is now of a lower socioeconomic class
than in 1975 and, thus, is subsidized by society to a greater
extent than before. This would tend to proportionally shrink
taxes on earnings for both smokers and non—smoking smokerE.
Per Capita Cigarette Consumption
The cost estimates have been adjusted for changes in the per
capita consumption of cigarettes. Data for 1923 to 1990cn per
capita cigarette consumption is drawn from the National Cancer
Institute, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Strategies to Control Tobacco Use in the United States. Data for
1991 to 1993 are drawn from the U.S. Department of Agricuiture,
Tobacco Situation and Outlook Report, September 1993.
Percentage of Population Smoking (P)
Data (%smoking20 years of age) for 1965—66, 70, 74, 76—
80, 83, and 85 from Reducing the Health Conseauences of Smokina:
25 Years of Progress, a Report of the Surgeon General, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 1989, p. 269. Data (%
smoking￿ 18 years of age) for 1987—88 and 90 from Health United
States. 1991, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1992,
p. 203. Data (￿18) for 1949, 57, 58 and 64 from Smoking and
Health, a Report of the Surgeon General, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, 1979, p.A—9. Data (￿18) for 1995, 91
from Center for Disease Control via "Smoking Split Decision" The
Courier Journal, 1/9/94, p1. All other years are linearly
estimated using the two closest years from which data is
available.
54Tar (T)
Data for 1954, and 68-83 is from Smoking. Tobacco, and
Health: A Fact Book,CDC,DI-iHS, p.21. Data for 1955—67 is from
The Health Consequences of Smoking: The Changing Cigarette, A
Report of the Surgeon General, DHHS, 1981, p.207. Data for 1984
to 1993 is derived by running a regression of %<l5mg on tar for
1967 to 1983 and using the resulting coefficient to estimate tar
levels. Data for 1923 to 1954 is derived by running a regression
of year on tar and using the resulting coefficient to estimate
tar levels.
% Less than 15mg
Data is taken from Federal Trade Commission Report to
Congress for 1990: Pursuant to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act. 1992, FTC, 1992, pp.28—30.
Unadjusted Packs per Smoker (S)
S =(C/20)/(P/100)
r—adjusted Per Capita Cigarette Consumption (CA)
CA =C*T/46.1
Tar-adjusted Packs per Smoker (SA)
SA =(CA/20)/(P/lOO)
Tar Adjustment (TAR)
The example below is for the twenty year moving average





The Manning 0% and 5% rates were taken from the Manning
study. The Manning 3% rate was calculated in the following
manner. First, Table A was constructed using data from Appendix
G and pp. 36-37 (in Manning). this gives the absolute and
proportional values for medical costs. From this it was found
thata 3% discount rate is equivalent to the 5% number plus 16%-
20% of the difference between 0% and 5% (depending upon whither
the cost in question occurs relatively early or late in life).
The lack of data for rionmedical costs resulted in educated
guesses being made in this range.
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